Recommendations for Subduing Criminalized Power Structures


Michael Dziedzic

I.                   Sharpen pre-mission assessments to detect whether CPS are potential spoilers


A.    Issue

In none of the cases examined in this volume was the threat posed by CPS recognized and addressed when the mandate was written. Typically, it took years or an existential crisis for missions to receive the authorities and capabilities to respond to the threat. Nothing in the Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s (DPKO) guidelines for strategic assessments[iii] or for the Integrated Mission Planning Process[iv] suggests that CPS might be a spoiler exploiting illicit revenues to undermine the peace process or sometimes constituting a root cause of the conflict itself. Nick Seymour, former Senior Chief of the DPKO Military Planning Service has indicated that the assessment process is effectively blind to this issue, stating that prior to drafting a mandate “There will be a significant amount of dialogue between the Secretariat and the various Member States and members of the Security Council…But the problem at the moment is that anything to do with corruption is missing from that dialogue…[v] The DPKO Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook promulgated in 2014 acknowledges that “…there is no agreed United Nations system-wide methodology for comprehensively assessing risks to the United Nations in post-conflict and conflict  settings.”[vi]

The threat posed by CPS to derail implementation of peace processes has been routinely overlooked for several reasons. One is the conventional wisdom that once a peace settlement has been achieved the only remaining requirement is “post-conflict reconstruction.” This fatally flawed conception prevails in spite of the fact that the Arusha Accords in Rwanda led directly to the genocide there and the Lomé peace agreement in Sierra Leone produced the hostage-taking of 500 UN troops by the RUF. In these cases, a root cause of the conflict was the unspeakable greed of the CPS involved. Iraq was also initially termed “post-conflict reconstruction” in ignorance of the virulent drivers of conflict that continued to persist there even after the departure of U.S. troops in 2011. Another reason for the international community’s blinders is that there has been a persistent inclination to dismiss the challenge posed by CPS as just corruption or organized crime and, therefore, not a concern for the peace process. Compounding this, peace settlements rarely if ever come to grips with the role of the underground political economy in fueling conflict, in all likelihood because the parties to the conflict themselves derive enormous illicit benefits from it and have no incentive to alter the status quo.

The essence of the solution is to assess whether CPS have been one or more of the protagonists in the conflict, which should at least be taken as a red flag that the strong potential exists that they may pose a risk to the peace process. The mandate should take this into account (see below), and mission planning should include spoiler management as a critical component. The following recommendations are designed to make this happen.

B.     Recommendations

·         The policy community needs to be educated about the CPS threat

During the Mar 16, 2015 conference conducted with the participation of the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to consider these recommendations, Len Hawley, former NSC Director for Multilateral Affairs, made the following recommendation:

As I read some of the material about people having their blinders on and so on and so forth, I figured well that was me…We really didn’t have a grasp of the real meaning of the long-term impact…My recommendation is that we put together something for policy makers to help them understand this challenge… Believe me this is not easy to understand even if you’re experienced in the kind of work of peacekeeping and stabilization.[vii]

The educational tools that this project aspires to develop include a guide to assessing the potential that CPS will operate as spoilers for impending missions and incorporating this information appropriately into strategic planning. If resources become available, development of a video to explain the essence of this challenge from a practitioner’s perspective would be another valuable educational tool.

        ·         Assessments should expose whether illicit revenues played a role in fueling the conflict

The essential discriminator for a CPS is exploitation of illicit revenue as the dominant means or motivation for pursuit of power. The result is a political economy that sustains conflict. Given that CPS constitute the predominant spoiler threat to peace missions, this is a litmus test for alerting planners and decision makers to the need prepare to deal with this challenge. The critical question is to determine what the principal sources of this funding are and whether the group is using them primarily as a means of addressing political aspirations or whether it is motivated principally by greed. A great deal of relevant data can be gleaned from open sources, including social media. Other fruitful places to look are the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, INTERPOL, reports by a UN Panel of Experts, international watchdog NGOs like Global Witness, Transparency International, and Global Financial Integrity, and scholars. The U.S. and other states with relevant criminal intelligence capabilities should hone their ability to contribute to assessments in conflict settings ripe for international intervention by gathering intelligence about illicit revenue streams, informal power structures, and linkages with transnational organized crime.[viii] At a minimum, this should inform the way the U.S. seeks to shape the mandate, and a briefing about potential spoilers should be offered to the SRSG, Force Commander, and Police Commissioner as soon possible after they have been appointed.

        ·          Assessments should identify the centers of power, their networks, enablers, and vulnerable nodes

It is essential to determine who wields both formal and informal power, what the networks are linking these centers of power, what the critical nodes and enablers in the structure are, and their vulnerabilities to criminal prosecution (e.g., extradition could be part of the strategy). Sarah Chayes in Thieves of State identified some essential elements of information, including “…the levers of power captured by the network, its favored revenue streams, its structure and manning, the degree of vertical integration, the internal and external enablers that reinforce it and facilitate its operations, its vulnerabilities…”[ix] Certainly a neighboring state that is exploiting the conflict to loot natural resources qualifies as an enabler, as do shell companies and other mechanisms used to launder money. Licit power structures and those that are neutral toward to peace process should also be identified as prospective components of the coalition for peace. These analytical steps are crucial for developing the “ways” that the strategy can be designed to subdue the CPS spoiler threat.

        ·         Assessments should determine whether core state institutions are part of the solution or the problem

It is crucial to assess whether core state institutions (e.g., armed forces, intelligence service, legal system and police, customs, central bank, procurement) have been captured by a CPS. One telltale marker is the dysfunction of the prevailing accountability regime and the duress under which investigative journalists, civil society organizations devoted to good governance, and human rights bodies must operate. The critical question for properly sequencing the strategy is whether critical institutions are politicized and part of the problem or whether they are accountable to the law and part of the solution. If the former, the appropriate strategy is not to launch a massive capacity building program so that ownership can be rapidly turned over to national actors who are complicit in criminal enterprises. The first step must be to depoliticize and decriminalize the levers of power. Vetting is often regarded as sufficient. The most decisive function, however, is prosecution and adjudication of ongoing crimes that enable and empower the CPS. When the legal system has been co-opted or cowed by the prevailing regime, investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of crimes against the mission and its mandate must be accomplished by international and national actors working together using hybrid justice institutions (See Section II). In terms of sequencing, this should be put in place prior to or at least on a simultaneous basis with capacity building.

·         Assess what type or types of CPS have driven or contributed to the conflict

Power structures vary dramatically in their orientation toward the peace process and their propensity for violence, so it is also critical to assess whether they are likely to be irreconcilable, to oppose the peace process through violent means, or to support it nominally while actually delegitimizing it through rampant corruption. Although this is a process that will take time to refine through future application, some provisional indicators are as follows:

o   Irreconcilables may be more likely to be motivated by greed than grievance. Thus peace processes that address contentious political issues but which also seek to deprive irreconcilable CPS of access to their sources of plunder could produce an implacable response (e.g., RUF in Sierra Leone and gangs in Haiti).


o   Violent opposition to the peace process is likely when the peace agreement has left core issues unresolved.

o   For CPS that support the peace process the essence of the challenge is to resist the temptation to disregard their reliance on illicit sources of revenue to maintain power.

CPS are not necessarily monolithic, moreover, and the distinction between irreconcilables and negotiable opponents who use violence is not readily discernible. Negotiations may have taken place in bad faith but that may not become apparent until the implementation process unfolds (e.g., the RUF). Alternatively, one faction may be willing to abide by the agreement, but it may be too risky for it to attempt to do so until the irreconcilable faction is neutralized. Owing to the inherent uncertainly about making this distinction, prudence dictates that the mission come prepared for the worst case while continuing to keep the channels for negotiation open. Additionally, there is a continuing need for assessment even after the peace process has begun.

        ·         The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the European Union, the African Union  and interested Member States should form a working group to develop an assessment framework for prospective spoilers

The critical need to improve the ability of UN assessments to identify the role of international crime and terrorism as a strategic threat to mission’s has already been highlighted by DPKO’s Senior Police Advisor, Stefan Feller, who has called for creation of “…a worldwide strategic threat assessment that would allow policymakers to better understand what needs to be addressed as drivers of conflict. Such an informed assessment would enrich the process of shaping mandates for peace operations.”[x] Hilde Johnson, a member of the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, has also highlighted the need for “…understanding the drivers of conflict and the incentives and an analysis of what would it take to build peace among those different actors. I think that is also part of the weakness of the system that one doesn’t do that in depth and hence you get relapse in many situations…”[xi] Many CPS certainly feature international crime and terrorism as modus operandi, including when a neighboring state either funds a rebel movement through illicit transactions or colludes with it to plunder the conflict state’s resources; however, assessments should also bore in on domestic crime in the form of grand corruption by the political class as a precipitant of conflict and an incentive to spoil the quest for peace. Owing to the predominance of CPS as spoilers, a collective effort should be undertaken to develop an assessment framework to discern who the likely spoilers are, of whatever ilk. This analysis should be an integral component of a conflict assessment framework along with all other drivers of conflict. The working group should also identify the information requirements and prospective sources of information about political-criminal networks in conflict settings.

II.                Mandates should provide adequate authority and capacity to deal with CPS

A.    Issue

The failure to provide essential authorities and capabilities required to deal with spoilers at the outset of an intervention has condemned the missions examined in this volume to years of incompetence at best (e.g., Guatemala, Bosnia, DRC, Kosovo, and Afghanistan). At worst, missions have run a serious risk of collapse (e.g. Sierra Leone, Haiti, and Iraq[xii]). The fundamental decision that must be made by the mandating body, according to Elizabeth Andersen, author of the “Mandates” Chapter in Vol. II, Combatting Criminalized Power Structures: A Toolkit, “…is situating the mandate at the appropriate point on the spectrum between support and substitution (Italics added).”[xiii] The core problem is that the UN and EU do not conceive of this choice as a spectrum but have created a false dichotomy involving only two options: either completely replacing their local counterparts (i.e., exercising full executive authority, also known as substitution) or providing advice and assistance to develop their proficiency (i.e., capacity building or strengthening).[xiv] Owing to the “all or nothing” conception of these alternatives, strengthening is the default choice. The DPKO Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers, for example, makes it clear the UN prefers the strengthening option, asserting that “International actors, including judicial affairs officers, should work with, rather than substitute for, national counterparts.”[xv] If, however, the essence of the threat to the rule of law, and stabilization generally, is not lack of ability but impunity for those in power, then a strengthening strategy could actually make matters worse. When the pre-mission assessment indicates that CPS will likely play a spoiler role and the legal system is part of the problem not the solution, Andersen asserts, “Most mandates should probably fall somewhere in the middle of this spectrum, according the mission more intrusive, executive authorities in areas in which the CPS is particularly entrenched or likely to obstruct mission objectives.” Andersen concludes, “Too often, mandates have been belatedly strengthened to meet CPS challenges that should have been appreciated at the mission design stage…”[xvi] To “right size” mandates it is essential to expand the repertoire to include a “partnership” option involving collaborative exercise of executive authority that is narrowly targeted on the type of threats that CPS are likely to pose to the mission and mandate.

B.     Recommendations

        ·         A mandate authorizing use of hybrid justice institutions (HJI) for serious crimes that threaten the peace process should be a preferred option[xvii]

When assessments indicate criminalized political networks have actively suborned the legal system for political purposes or intimidated it into passivity, mandates should authorize an intermediate partnership option between extensive substitution (i.e. executive mandates involving exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial powers) and passive strengthening. The proposed partnership option would be confined exclusively to dealing with crimes against the peace process or “mandate crimes” and gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law committed by high-to-intermediate level CPS figures. Mandate crimes would include politically motivated attacks on civilians, theft of international assistance, grand corruption that drains the government of essential revenue for peacebuilding (as well as public trust and legitimacy), intimidation or assassination of witnesses in these cases, espionage against the mission, and attempts to bribe, suborn or intimidate mission staff. This would constitute a very small subset of the national criminal caseload, certainly no more than one per cent. Specific authorities would be limited to arrest, detention, investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and incarceration with respect to the above crimes committed after the mandate has been enacted.

These limited investigative and adjudicatory powers would be exercised in collaboration with national authorities through hybrid justice institutions (HJI): a hybrid police unit, prosecution office, special court, detention center, and high-security prison comprised of both international and carefully vetted and protected national officials. The HJI should be established with investigative and first instance jurisdiction over the limited class of crimes specified above, with exclusive appellate jurisdiction as well. The DPKO Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers actually recognizes the need for a hybrid special court when there is a “…lack of capacity and/or independence and impartiality of the national justice system.”[xviii] The mission should make it an immediate priority to protect the local police, prosecutors, judges, and jailors who are working in collaboration with the international community along with their families (See Section VI). International judges should initially comprise a majority on judicial panels, and international prosecutors should initially make decisions concerning investigations, arrests, and indictments. International prosecutors should have access to all criminal intelligence gathered by the mission.[xix] Primacy should transition to national counterparts once the latter have demonstrated their ability to stand up to impunity by investigating, indicting and convicting (when the evidence merits) CPS “big fish” without suffering retaliation.[xx] 

The hybrid special court should also be used to hold international civilian staff members and experts on mission accountable for such serious crimes that the head of the mandating organization (e.g., the UN Secretary General) determines warrant lifting their immunity. There is precedent for this as personnel working for the UN Mission in Kosovo were tried in the mission’s equivalent of hybrid panels in Kosovo after their immunity had been lifted. This is critically important since the failure to uphold the rule of law on mission members would only reinforce the belief that those who wield power also enjoy impunity.[xxi] 

There is a potential for conflict between the UN principle of consent of the parties to the conflict[xxii] and prosecution for mandate crimes when the prospective indictee is a leading figure in a CPS as well as a primary interlocutor in the peace process. Prosecutors should never be constrained in the conduct of investigations, but to manage this dilemma, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) or equivalent should be allowed to request a delay in filing of an indictment or execution of an international prosecutor’s arrest order for CPS figures who are vital to the peace process. The purpose would be to allow the SRSG to give the high-level CPS suspect a formal warning that any further crimes against the mandate would constitute proof of bad faith and obstructionism and result in arrest or indictment through the hybrid justice institutions for all relevant crimes. Additionally, the second tier of the CPS network consisting of strategic enablers and other vulnerable nodes should be high-priority targets, as described below in Section III. It will be essential for the mission to explain the purpose, rationale, and limited remit of the HJI to the citizens of the host country along with a timely and transparent accounting of all the cases under its jurisdiction.


·         The implementing statue for HJI should provide an enabling legal framework

The statute under which the HJI operate should include the procedural and substantive tools needed for successful prosecution of deeply entrenched CPS. This includes procedural provisions to offer “little fish” immunity for testimony against the “big fish;” covert and technical measures of surveillance; witness and victim protection measures (and a funded program for relocation); provisions for “whistle-blowers;” and international mutual legal assistance including asset discovery, forfeiture, and recovery. Substantively, the legal framework will need to include within the jurisdiction of the HJI money laundering, corruption, organized crime, and obstruction of justice and witness intimidation.[xxiii] These procedural and substantive provisions could be incorporated in a peace agreement if it includes HJI, or the mandate could direct that the court’s implementing statue include modern prosecutorial tools and that specified crimes against the mandate be properly criminalized. This statute should be publicized and readily accessible.

        ·         When negotiating peace agreements, international peace makers should suggest including hybrid justice institutions for crimes against the mandate

Owing to the potential reluctance of mandating authorities to impose limitations on national sovereignty, peace negotiators, especially DPA and potentially DPKO, should suggest inclusion of HJI as part of the terms of a peace agreement. Since the parties to a conflict will inevitably be wary of whether the other party will abide by the agreement, the inclusion of HJI would be in the interest of all those who are negotiating in good faith. Alternatively, if an international criminal tribunal is created, it should be given jurisdiction not only for retrospective gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law but for prospective violations, including mandate crimes. As our case studies indicate, there is likely to be extensive overlap between perpetrators of war crimes and the kingpins of a CPS. HJI should be used to retain the capacity building benefits of collaboration between international and national officials. If the peace agreement and mandate do not include HJI, the final alternative would be for the mission to negotiate their establishment with the government, but this would run the risk that the authority of the court could be diluted to the point that its ability to challenge the impunity of the CPS could be seriously constrained and circumvented. This occurred with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) when international judges were initially included in the prevailing District Court structure as one member of a five judge panel, the other four members of which were Kosovar Albanians. The result was that international judges became associated with patently unjust verdicts against Serb defendants, and they were precluded from even voicing their misgivings.

        ·         The mission should have a mandate to shut down the illicit sources of revenue responsible for fueling the conflict that were identified during the assessment process

The range of tools is described in Section III. The most salient authority would be the use of international monitors to oversee the process of revenue collection and expenditure.

        ·         Mandates for missions facing potentially violence-prone CPS should include authorization for the use of force, protection of civilians, and  robust forces

For potentially violence-prone CPS, missions will need authorization for the use of force to protect civilians along with robust international military contingents and police forces, including Formed Police Units (Section VI) and capabilities to enable criminal intelligence-led policing (See Section V). As the Brahimi Report asserted in 2000, “…when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them.[xxiv] If the necessary authorities and capabilities are not provided, it might be appropriate to vote against the resolution rather than set the mission up for failure.

        ·         The SRSG or Head of Mission should be empowered in the mandate to request additional authorities for dealing with unanticipated spoiler threats

Mandates should invite the SRSG or other Head of Mission to return to the mandating authority when an unanticipated spoiler threat emerges to request additional authorities and capabilities.

III.             The flow of illicit revenue to CPS must be severed


A.    Issue

The center of gravity for any CPS is its ability to generate and exploit ill-gotten gains. Yet the international community routinely pours billions of dollars of assistance into societies struggling to pull themselves out of conflict while failing to stanch the diversion of the country’s own financial and natural resources into the bank accounts of those responsible for the conflict. At a minimum, this enables kleptocratic governance, and at worst it paves the path to renewed conflict. In either case, this is a failure to adhere to one of the most fundamental principles for international interveners: do no harm. Nor are effective measures installed to bring internationals and nationals to justice for absconding with assistance funds. Some of the measures recommended below will be decried as an affront to national sovereignty by those who would find their ability to pilfer the national treasury or patrimony restricted; however, when this has been one of the root causes, or an accelerant of the original conflict, or a motive for spoiling behavior, such self-serving claims should be recognized as specious and scurrilous. Sovereignty cuts both ways and there is no obligation for donors to allow their scarce resources to be exploited by CPS to enrich and perpetuate themselves in power while simultaneously spoiling the peace process.

The critical first step in this process, as recommended above, is that “Assessments should expose the role of illicit revenues in fueling the conflict.” Depending on the source of the illicit revenue streams (e.g., pillaging the country’s natural resources, looting the national treasury, and/or colluding with transnational criminal enterprises), a range of financial tools can be used to restrict the hemorrhaging of revenue. These include:

·         Supply chain controls to curb looting of natural resources

·         Panels of Experts to expose the nature of the networks involved

·         Targeted sanctions (i.e., smart sanctions) and seizure of criminally derived assets to deprive key actors of access to their lucre

·         Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to curtail money laundering

·         Monitoring of governmental revenue generation and expenditure, similar to the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), to constrict the diversion of government revenue for private gain

·         Public registries of beneficial ownership to provide transparency regarding enablers

·         Hybrid justice institutions with jurisdiction to provide legal consequences for theft of national and international revenue (Described in the “Mandates Should Provide Adequate Authority and Capacity to Deal with CPS” section )

The efficacy of these instruments can be enhanced through the measures described below.

B.     Recommendations


·         The US and European Union should take the lead in organizing a coalition to stanch the flow of illicit revenues using targeted sanctions, asset seizure, and USA PATRIOT Act

Targeted sanctions and asset seizure have been unleashed with decided impact against terrorists and transnational organized crime. They need to be harnessed for the benefit of peace implementation against the nemesis of CPS with which these other international security threats are often intertwined. The US can also lend substantial weight to international regimes by invoking Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act against money laundering by CPS.


·         Panels of Experts should be used to identify networks responsible for  illicit revenue streams and used to shape peace agreements and mandates

Before peace agreements and mandates are drafted, the data collected by Panels of Experts should be fully exploited to identify the illegal sources of revenue that have driven the conflict and the structures of the networks involved, including the enablers who play critical roles in funneling hot money to safe havens.[xxv] This information should be integrated into the terms of the negotiations for peace agreements as well as the mission planning process.

·         International and domestic watchdog NGOs should be empowered to name and shame parties profiting from perpetuating conflict

International watchdog NGOs like Global Witness, Transparency International, Global Financial Integrity, and the Enough Project have a vital role to play in identifying the individuals, corporations, and countries that profit by trading in lootable commodities. This raises the costs for actors who are circumventing supply chain controls rather than placing corporations that comply with them at a competitive disadvantage. Additionally, international NGOs can play a critical role in nurturing the development of local counterpart organizations with the critical forensic accounting and monitoring skills to scrutinize and expose shady dealings by prominent elites (See “Community-based Monitoring” in Vol. II, Combating Criminalized Power Structures: A Toolkit). It is more effective and sustainable when local actors take the lead to challenge CPS, but initially it may be too risky for them. The international community may need to take the initiative and demonstrate that impunity can be confronted successfully, thereby creating the space for local NGOs to operate. 

        ·         States should be included in supply chain control sanctions regimes

 “Conflict-free” certification regimes should be reformed to include states as well as rebel groups as targets for sanctions.

        ·         The Dodd-Frank requirements for transparency in sourcing of conflict minerals or the “OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas”[xxvi] should be broadly adopted by countries that are manufacturers or consumers of products using conflict minerals

        ·         Supply chain control regimes should be created for all types of looted national resources

Other materials besides diamonds and conflict minerals are vulnerable to looting such as timber, oil, ivory, antiquities, and agricultural items. If any of these are a prominent source of illicit funding for parties involved in future conflicts, a supply chain control regime should be enacted.

        ·         International monitoring of revenue generation and expenditure should be required whenever a state-based CPS has been a driver or sustainer of conflict

A program similar to GEMAP that was used in Liberia should be included in mission mandates. Alternatively, the authority to monitor major sources of government revenue and expenditures should be made a condition for international assistance by bilateral and multilateral donors. As the authors of the GEMAP section in the Toolkit chapter document, “GEMAP reduced the ability of corrupt actors to feed on government finances and to undermine the country’s principal source of financing.”[xxvii] GEMAP was also effective at introducing proper economic management practices, transparency and accountability.

        ·         Create public registries of beneficial ownership

Transparency about the identity of those who control a company or bank account (i.e., beneficial ownership) is essential to follow the money trail of suspected illicit activities. This facilitates prosecution, asset recovery, and determination of who was responsible for fraudulent development projects. This should be mandatory for governments seeking international assistance in the wake of a conflict.

        ·         Reform of the Customs Service should be a top priority

In the aftermath of violent conflict, internal mechanisms of taxation are likely to be in disarray with a long lead time before they can begin to function. The only immediate source of revenue to fund vital government services such as the security sector, legal system, education, and health care is taxation of imports. Thus, reconstitution of the Customs Service should be a priority, but it must be done in a manner that protects the integrity of the revenue stream from CPS. The most effective way to accomplish this is international monitoring of the prominent sources of revenue generation, as recommended above.

        ·         When consent is a constraint, focus on enablers and vulnerable nodes in illicit networks

Owing to the need to maintain consent of the parties to the peace process, a top-down approach to enforcement actions may be constrained if the political strongman at the helm of a CPS is also a primary interlocutor with the international community; however, criminalized networks require a structure of internal collaborators and external partners (e.g. financial institutions, legitimate corporations or shell companies, state and non-state actors) to enable their transnational crimes and provide the ability to shelter their illicit profits. It is essential, therefore, that the strategic enablers and vulnerable nodes of CPS be identified and that they become primary targets.   

IV.             Accountability should have a priority equal to capacity building[xxviii]

A.    Issue

The overarching strategy for dealing with the CPS spoiler threat, as described in the conclusion, requires three major lines of effort:


1.      Diminishing the drivers of conflict, which is precisely what a CPS is if it persists in engaging in spoiling behavior after the mission begins.

2.      Developing the capacity of indigenous institutions to resolve conflict peacefully so they provide a more attractive, legitimate pathway to wealth and power.

3.      Establishing safeguards on the performance of core state institutions so they function to sustain peace and are not recaptured by CPS.


Safeguards are essential, therefore, to provide an assurance that the institutional capacity being developed by the international community functions in a manner that is consistent with the rule of law and is not perverted to empower the same criminalized elements that were responsible for the conflict.  The tendency for the latter to happen is highlighted by Christine Cheng in “Private and Public Interests: Informal Actors, informal influence, and economic order after war”:


…emphasizing capacity building without understanding the linkages between formal and informal actors can actually end up undermining the state institutions being supported...the current emphasis by scholars and policy makers on strengthening formal institutions and formal actors without due regard for informal politics is deeply problematic.”[xxix]

The international community, has, nevertheless, typically prioritized developing the capacity of security forces (military and police), mistakenly regarding this as an expedient exit strategy, while affording accountability a lesser priority and deferring it until later in the planning sequence. In a study by Serge Rumin of 140 police reform projects conducted in a dozen UN missions from 2001-2010, the overwhelming majority were devoted to capacity building activities (i.e., training, equipping, and drafting new laws and codes). There was nothing, however, in the category related to accountability, that is “programs designed to alter the incentives, values and organizational cultures of previously dysfunctional, corrupt and often brutal police, judicial and penal systems.”[xxx] When impunity permeates the legal system and the security sector is politicized, they are part of the problem. Capacity building programs alone will not correct this, and enhancing their prowess may exacerbate the problem. When this is overlooked and accountability is not afforded at least equal priority with capacity building from the start of the mission, the international community will inevitably become a captive of the “success” of ill-conceived capacity building programs that it has predicated its exit strategy upon.[xxxi] Seeking to correct a dysfunctional accountability regime years later is a fool’s errand. The gravest potential threat to an effective accountability regime is likely to be the various intelligence activities employed by the parties to the conflict. They are often thoroughly politicized and linked to organized crime and gross human rights abuses. Delaying the development of accountability mechanisms for this insidious source of spoiling behavior will only make it an insurmountable challenge as the mission wears out its welcome years later.

The predominant pattern is that accountability mechanisms that are internal to the state (commonly referred to as “horizontal accountability”),[xxxii] such as an inspector general function within the various agencies of government, the judicial system, and the legislature, will be captives of the CPS that controls the executive branch. It will also be essential to assess whether civil society organizations such as a free press, think tanks, and watchdog NGOs and community oversight bodies (referred to as “vertical” accountability) and independent bodies such as an ombudsman and human rights commission to which citizens can report complaints (referred to as “diagonal” accountability) have been co-opted or cowed by CPS (See the Vol. II chapter  on “Accountability as a Countermeasure”). Since these external accountability mechanisms are likely to have been repressed, it will be crucial to identify those that remain objective and willing to function but have simply been unable to do so effectively. 

The standard practice for the international community is to vet members of the former warring parties, including the police force, for war crimes and gross human rights violations, prior to admitting them into capacity building programs. Additionally programs are likely to be added to develop internal inspector general capabilities, especially in the security sector, along with external civilian oversight bodies. While these are all very necessary, they are unlikely to be sufficient in the face of an entrenched CPS. Internal or horizontal accountability mechanisms will typically be subservient and unresponsive. Civil society and nominally independent bodies will have been heavily repressed and while they may still be willing to perform their functions, it will be essential for the international community to open the space for them to operate and to protect them when they do. A more robust approach is needed, therefore, including the lines of effort outlined below.

B.     Recommendations

·         International actors will need to play a prominent role in establishing accountability, with special attention given to the intelligence apparatus

Hybrid justice institutions, described above, are essential for breaking the hammerlock of impunity. Additionally, to open and protect the space for accountability, international mentors and monitors should immediately be installed in all layers of accountability (i.e. horizontal, vertical, and diagonal). To the maximum extent possible, international mentors should strive to establish hybrid domestic and international accountability mechanisms.[xxxiii] Particular emphasis should be placed on the security sector (especially the intelligence structures of the parties to the conflict), the legal system, revenue generation and expenditure, and the electoral process. It is exceedingly difficult to establish accountability over state intelligence agencies because they are shrouded in a veil of secrecy. Compounding this, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes never address what to do with intelligence operatives. This, along with their potential to be the principle agents of violent obstruction of the peace process, calls out for accountability of intelligence entities to be a priority. The legislature is perhaps the most effective means of holding intelligence agencies accountable in the long run. Judges should also be required to authorize intelligence operations that might infringe upon individual rights. An ombudsman, human rights commission, or citizen accountability board should be created with which citizens can file complaints.[xxxiv] At all the various layers of accountability, mentors should assist in building capacity and conducting investigations of misconduct. Monitors should gather data required for performance metrics and play a key role in assessing the data, discussed below. Both mentors and monitors should identify when national officials are facing reprisals so measures can be taken to protect them.

·         The mandating organization and relevant international donors should make it a priority to develop a coordinated strategy for establishing an effective accountability regime in concert with capacity building activities

The “United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts” establishes as one of its ten principles to “Lead and collaborate more effectively as the United Nations in support of national capacity development… This requires proactive collaboration…with other partners.”[xxxv] The UN Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook also endorses a lead role for the UN in forging international unity of effort.[xxxvi] The Guidance Note on capacity building also recommends that international actors “Explore how to improve the environment in which these organisations and institutions operate, by strengthening the space and capacity of citizens, media and oversight bodies to demand transparency and accountability.”[xxxvii] Thus, the UN at least has acknowledged the necessity to take the lead when it is the mandating organization, and it has also recognized the criticality of developing accountability and transparency in tandem with capacity building.[xxxviii] Other international organizations and leading bilateral and multilateral donors should endorse, adopt, and collaborate in implementing these principles.

·         Levels of international assistance for capacity building and reconstruction should be made contingent on meeting annual benchmarks for accountability

Transparency International highlights a common deficiency in international monitoring of security sector assistance in a report published in 2015, stating that:

The current way of monitoring and tracking security assistance programmes—including military training and equipment transfers—is not sufficient when it comes to managing the risks posed by corrupt structures… Crucially, the recipient country institutions—including parliamentary defence committees, Office of the Auditor General, and the civil society—need to be empowered to conduct meaningful oversight of defence institutions’ funding and activities, including international aid.[xxxix]

To provide clout to the coordinated strategy recommended above, it is essential to establish metrics for determining whether the efficacy of the accountability regime is improving or not. The results must be tied to a reallocation of international resources. The first step is to establish a baseline to determine whether the multiple layers of accountability are functioning, both those external to the state (i.e., civil society and independent bodies) and internal to the government. Among the most crucial measures of performance are whether the legal system can confront impunity and whether diversion of public resources, human rights abuses, and electoral fraud are declining.[xl] Ideally, donors would establish a common set of metrics, but if that’s too arduous, the alternative would be for bilateral and multilateral donors to consult annually to pool their data and craft a common assessment. An annual consolidated progress report for the coordinated strategy on accountability and capacity building should be issued that identifies the most serious accountability deficiencies along with recommendations for correcting them. Adjustments to levels of international assistance should be made in consonance with the outcomes, positive and negative, indicated in the assessment. Donors must be willing to use metrics to determine whether funding should be reallocated by reducing capacity building programs where the trend lines are negative and increasing spending for accountability programs where most required.[xli]

·         Efforts to nurture accountability mechanisms will be vitiated unless international staff are also held accountable

As indicated in Section II, hybrid justice institutions should be created for crimes against the mission and used to try cases against international staff members and experts on mission if the head of the mandating organization decides that their immunity should be lifted. The chain of command of those found guilty of gross misconduct should also be reprimanded.


·         Civil society and independent bodies are the best place to start developing accountability

In cases where the state has been captured by a criminalized political class and the internal, state-based instruments of accountability are in their grip, the best place to invest will be in the external mechanisms of accountability in civil society and truly independent agencies. To advance the process of dismantling the old order where impunity prevails and establishing a new one where rule-of-law triumphs over predatory interests, civil society needs to be mobilized and strengthened so it can provide an effective means of transparency and opposition to the abuse of power. NGOs like Global Witness and Transparency International should be funded at the outset of the mission to train and develop counterpart national NGOs.

·         Community-based monitoring of reconstruction projects should be promoted[xlii]

Bilateral and multilateral donors should report their assistance using the International Aid Transparency Initiative[xliii] and promote community-based monitoring of reconstruction projects as a means of establishing transparency during implementation (See Vol. II “Community-based Monitoring” for a step-by-step discussion). Community-based monitoring is a nascent state-building tool which aims to embed a citizenship consciousness in citizens and state officials. In the long-term, it is intended to change social norms that had previously tolerated criminal patronage networks or were intimidated by them. Perhaps the most egregious violation of the “do no harm” dictum would be to fail to put procedures in place to expose the diversion of international assistance into the coffers of CPS, thereby strengthening elements responsible for spoiling the peace process.

·         A “Civil Society Triangle” of grassroots NGOs, investigative journalism, and Think Tanks should be nurtured[xliv]

Nurturing grassroots NGOs capable of providing transparency for aid and reconstruction efforts and advocating for accountability for gross abuse, as described above, is vitally important but insufficient. The international community should also invest in creating synergy among such NGOs devoted to transparency and accountability, Think Tanks, and investigative journalists, as proposed in Vol. II chapter 14, “The Civil Society’Triangle’”. In Kosovo, this was a powerful tool for holding mayors accountable by comparing their performance in office with their campaign pledges. One of the most dangerous former Kosovo Liberation Army “warlords” was brought to trial by the European Union’s EULEX hybrid special court because of the united efforts of the Civil Society Triangle after he threatened a journalist who exposed his misconduct in office.[xlv]

V. Criminal intelligence-led policing should be integrated into the mission response[xlvi]

A.    Issue

At best intelligence has been an afterthought for peacekeeping missions, and at worst it has been treated as antithetical to peacekeeping principles. Absent intelligence, however, missions can only react after the fact to politically motivated violence. This confines missions to a never-ending game of whack-a-mole. If intelligence continues to be managed as an ad hoc effort, missions will be unable to gain the upper hand effectively against entrenched illicit networks, rendering missions incapable of shielding vulnerable civilians, protecting their own resources, or creating the security environment necessary for humanitarian assistance and sustainable development. When the pre-mission assessment indicates that CPS are liable to play a spoiler role, the perpetrators of criminal activity against the mission and mandate must be ferreted out, their capacity for violence constrained, and their criminal sources of revenue cut off. The empirical evidence accumulated in this volume, along with the escalating terrorist threat encountered by many recent missions, suggests that cases when criminal intelligence-led policing should be adopted are becoming the norm rather than the exception. The most effective way to control the deleterious impact of CPS spoilers and build sustainable peace is to collect the necessary information to seize the initiative and mount criminal intelligence-led investigations and operations to achieve one of two effects:

1. Prevent or disrupt violent activity, or

2.  Dislocate and dismantle obstructionist networks by well-informed strategies that expose criminal activity and linkages, crack the foundations of corruption and impunity, and build public confidence by demonstrating mission commitment and competence.

The way to achieve this is through lawful means and procedures: gathering evidence, executing arrests, and prosecuting key actors. Although the UN has used Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs) to gather intelligence, the guidance and policy for their use has them focused on strategic intelligence. With the notable exception of the successful use of tactical intelligence against the gangs in Haiti, missions have avoided collecting actionable intelligence.

B.      Recommendations

·         The UN should expand upon the use of criminal intelligence-led policing as a legal and accountable operational  concept

Intelligence-led policing is a standard practice by modern police forces worldwide drawing upon the sources of criminal intelligence that are integral to professional policing:  open source data,[xlvii] human source management,[xlviii]  and technical data collection.[xlix] In a momentous advance in policy, the DPKO Police Division issues guidelines for police operations in January 2016 that declared “The United Nations police are a criminal intelligence-led service” and that they “taget peace spoilers through special operations.[l] UN guidelines and policy should be further revised to encourage and empower missions, depending on the nature of the spoiler threat, to provide JMACs access to the suite of criminal intelligence collection options cited above and to use this to develop criminal information packages against illicit organizations and their leaders whose activities threaten security and the mission mandate. This information should be converted into evidence for the purpose of prosecution either by the international community, the host government, or preferably by hybrid justice institutions, as described above.

·         DPKO should develop internal oversight procedures for the collection and use of intelligence in mission

Owing to the necessity to gather intelligence for force protection purposes, military peacekeeping contingents have routinely done so. UN Police also are known to pay informants because this is how professional police do their job, although they do it out of pocket since the UN does not provide for this. Since the UN has turned a blind eye to the requirement for intelligence collection, until the Police Division published guidelines for police operations, there are no oversight mechanismsin place to guard against potential misuse. In tandem with the above proposal to embrace criminal intelligence-led policing for missions confronted by CPS, DPKO should establish internal oversight procedures to ensure accountability.


·         DPKO should develop a cadre of criminal intelligence professionals

An international intelligence pick-up team that rotates personnel in and out of the mission on an annual basis is unlikely to gain the upper hand against an entrenched illicit network that is adroit at operating with impunity. Success demands a professional approach, and UN Missions should be deployed with the foundations of a properly staffed JMAC and Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU) for the police contingent.[li] This could be done in conjunction with the DPKO Standing Police Capacity, making criminal intelligence professionals available to serve in mission planning and in JMAC and CIU leadership roles, supported by specialists in open source research, human source management, intelligence analysis, surveillance, and complex prosecutions, including criminal conspiracy and financial investigations.


·         DPKO should maintain a JMAC start-up package at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi

UN Missions should be rapidly deployed with a properly resourced JMAC. To enable this, a start-up kit of equipment necessary to establish a JMAC and an associated criminal investigative capability (as described in “Criminal Intelligence-led Policing” in chapter 16, Vol. II) should be established and maintained at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy.


·         Member states, particularly those that embrace and employ modern concepts of criminal intelligence-led policing, should support JMACs and the CIU with Criminal Intelligence

Member States with relevant criminal intelligence resources, including the U.S. and the mission’s leading troop and police contributing countries, should second intelligence personnel to the JMAC and continuously support the mission by making it a priority to gather and provide criminal intelligence about informal power structures, their illicit revenue streams, and their linkages with transnational organized crime. UN missions should make it a preference when hiring international prosecutors that they have the ability to obtain a security clearance from a Member State willing to provide the mission with criminal intelligence and arrange with Member States to expedite the clearances of prosecutors once hired. For reasons of independence and sufficient continuity to complete criminal proceedings, international judges and prosecutors should have at least two year contracts, if possible. Additionally, missions should establish criminal information-sharing procedures with regional law enforcement entities that function in the mission area.

VI. Formed Police Units require a surge capacity and specialized policing capabilities

A.    Issue

Two critical public security gaps recurrently confound peace missions: a deployment gap and an enforcement gap.[lii] The first is the time lag between deployment of military contingents and police forces. If missions have only military firepower to call upon during the “golden hour” at the beginning of the mission, response options are liable to be reduced to observing the mayhem or using lethal force against the very civilians that the mission is mandated to protect. To fill this gap, rapidly deployable “stability police units,” possessing non-lethal crowd and riot control options, are required.[liii] Since 2000, UN peacekeeping operations have deployed an increasing number of Formed Police Units (FPUs) that could theoretically be used to fill this gap, but no surge capability has ever been developed. As of early 2015, 70 FPUs were authorized for UN missions, but only 62 were deployed, exacerbating the deployment gap for any new missions that might arise before this deficit is filled. The enforcement gap relates to the law enforcement challenge of arresting key spoilers who are the source of disorder. FPUs are designed exclusively for crowd and riot control, however, and apprehending dangerous criminals requires units with other specialized police skills including surveillance and Special Weapon and Tactics Teams (SWAT) capable of high-risk arrest. Preventing the assassination of courageous local leaders and officials who have taken the risk for peace requires a close protection capability. Unless both of these gaps are addressed, the capacity to capitalize on criminal intelligence and seize the initiative against violent obstructionists embedded in informal structures of power will be negligible. Recommendations for closing each of these gaps are developed below.

B.     Recommendations

·         The US should maximize its support for the DPKO Formed Police Unit Standby Initiative through the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership

In a 2014 report on the UN’s capacity for rapid deployment, Peter Langille wrote that “Over the past two years, DPKO’s Police Division heard from PPCs [Police Contributing Countries] expressing interest in contributing to FPUs that had the personnel they needed but not the money required to procure the appropriate equipment.”[Brackets added][liv] The Police Division responded with a Formed Police Unit Standby Initiative aimed at creating contingents of trained and equipped FPUs available for deployment in 90 days by matching countries possessing the equipment required with countries willing to provide trained personnel. The U.S. should make it a priority to support this initiative.

            The most promising possibility is the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP), announced in August 2014, which is planned to provide $110 million annually for the next 3-5 years to develop African peacekeeping capacities, with the initial focus on Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.[lv] While initially focused on military units, the APRRP concept may be modified to allow as much as 10% of the funds to be used to develop FPU capabilities. Given that the cost of equipping an FPU can range up to $10 million, over five years this could result in the formation of at least five FPUs, with several more possible depending on the ability of the FPU contributing country to provide some of the required equipment. Given that the current deficit is eight units, it is conceivable this might only assist the UN in fielding a full complement of FPUs. Nevertheless, this would still endow the UN with a rapid deployment capability by allowing it to redeploy units from existing missions temporarily to support the startup of a new mission, as is routinely done.

·          “Specialized capacities” or “seconded specialized teams” should routinely be incorporated into UN police components when CPS are a spoiler threat

To address the enforcement gap when CPS are a threat to the mission and mandate, DPKO should routinely incorporate essential “specialized capacities” as part of FPUs or “seconded specialized teams” as part of the police contingent. For example, civil order maintenance and high-risk arrest are complementary capabilities that are essential for criminal intelligence-led operations since crowd and riot control units are needed to secure the perimeter of the target area while a SWAT team carries out an arrest. DPKO policy for UN Police permits this, stating that “Specialised capacities are another type of formed police unit. They are usually smaller units that serve a specific expert function and that vary in size depending on that function. Examples of specialized capacities are investigation or forensics teams, canine units or SWAT teams or close protection units.”[lvi] The other option is to deploy such units to the police contingent as seconded specialized teams. This option is far more appealing since members of FPUs receive meager compensations compared to other members of the police contingent. These options, however, are largely theoretical possibilities rather than deployed realities.  To operationalize this policy, the UN should work to develop a rapid deployment capability by identifying Member States that are willing to deploy or second teams with specialized skills in high-risk arrest, surveillance, close protection, criminal investigation and analysis, and forensics. The European Gendarmerie Force is one potential source for these capacities, and they have the flexibility to support the UN, European Union, and NATO. They draw primarily upon Gendarme-type forces in Europe that have a high degree of professionalism in each of the specialized skills mentioned CoESPU, and NATO’s Stability Police Units Center of Excellence can draw upon 15 years of experience with these specialized capacities and teams since NATO’s Multinational Specialized Units have made it a standard practice to incorporate specialized capabilities since their. Expanding on the range of potential contributors beyond the EGF would be essential to provide desirable flexibility in adapting to the political constraints of different missions. To the extent that doctrinal development for these specialized capacities is required, the EGF, CoESPU, and NATO’s Stability Police Units Center of Excellence can draw upon 15 years of experience since NATO’s Multinational Specialized Units have made it a standard practice to incorporate specialized capabilities since their initial deployment in 1999.

·         Operationalize the “Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians” by creating a stand-by pool of units available for rapid deployment

Recurrent failures to protect civilians prompted the 30 leading UN troop contributing countries and top 10 financial contributors to meet in Kigali, Rwanda in 2015 to establish the “Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians.” These principles call for the following:

-          To be prepared to use force to protect civilians, as necessary and consistent with the mandate.

-          Not to stipulate caveats or other restrictions that prevent us from fulfilling our responsibility to protect civilians in accordance with the mandate.

-          Not to hesitate to take action to protect civilians, in accordance with the rules of engagement, in the absence of an effective host government response...

-          To seek to identify, as early as possible, potential threats to civilians and proactively take steps to mitigate such threats and otherwise reduce the vulnerability of the civilian population.

-          To seek to enhance the arrangements for rapid deployment… exploring a system in which earmarked units from troop and police contributing countries could be placed in readiness in order to ensure rapid troop deployment.[lvii]


James Traub captures the significance of these principles, stating, “…in 2013, the Security Council broke with a tradition of impartial peacekeeping by authorizing an ‘intervention brigade’ to fight rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo who had been massacring villagers. The Kigali Principles formalize that commitment.”[lviii] The key to operationalizing these principles is to create a stand-by pool of units available for rapid deployment so that, as a U.S. official told Traub, “the U.N. will have an opportunity to repatriate the worst performing units.” It should become an explicit matter of UN policy that units that fail to comply with the Kigali Principles will be repatriated. For units already deployed on mission that have imposed caveats on the use of force to protect civilians, the UN should substantially reduce the rate at which they are reimbursed. Finally, the U.S. should remain engaged in vigorously supporting the fulfillment of commitments that have been made for more than 10,000 stand-by troops for future missions.

The unabashed aim of the above recommendations and suggestions for resolving the inevitable dilemmas and tradeoffs is to empower future missions to be fit for purpose and enhance their capacity to meet the expectations of the innocent victims of conflict.


[i] Stedman’s four cases that fit the description of criminalized power structures are the “akazu” in Rwanda that were described in the Introduction, Jonas Savimbi’s exploitation of diamonds in Angola, and the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen in Cambodia, both of which looted the country’s natural resources.

[ii] UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,“ In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All” March 2005, 8.

[iii] United Nations, “Guidelines: Strategic Assessment,” May 2009. The Guidelines list both “underlying causes and near-term effects.” The only underlying causes listed are “unequal access to resources, poor governance, inter-ethnic strife, separatist ambitions...”

[iv] United Nations, “Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General,” June 13, 2006

[v] Speaking at the National Defense University during the rollout of “Corruption Threats and International Missions: Practical Guidance for Leaders,” on September 30, 2014. 

[vi] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook, January, 2014, 32. Available at

[viii] See Phil Williams “Organized Crime in Iraq: Strategic Surprise and Lessons for Future Contingencies,” Prism, Vol 1, Issue 2, March 2010, 61.

[ix] Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2015) 189.

[x] Stefan Feller, “UN Police, International Crime and Terrorism,” Huffington Post, February 12, 2015. Available at

[xi] Hilde Johnson, Remarks made at the U.S. Institute of Peace, “The Future of U.N. Peace Operations: A Discussion with the Secretary General's High-Level Panel,” March 10, 2015. Available at, minute 34:30.

[xii] If we include the collapse of the Iraqi Army in 2014 after the conclusion of the international intervention.

[xiii] See the discussion of “Mandates” by Elizabeth Andersen in Vol II.

[xiv] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” June 2013, 24. Available at

[xv] Ibid. 28.

[xvi] Andersen, “Mandates.”

[xvii] See the discussion of “International Judges and Prosecutors” by Michael Hartmann and Agnieszka Klonowiecka in Vol II.

[xviii] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers,” 158.

[xix] If Member States provide intelligence to support the mission’s efforts against CPS, they should also provide at least one international police officer and one prosecutor with the requisite clearances.

[xx] Benchmarks would need to be established to provide indicators for when the transition should take place. For example, local judges would first have to demonstrate that they could judge cases on their merits and convict even the most powerful of elites. Then cases involving the “small fry” could be successfully referred to the domestic legal system. Subsequently, local judges and prosecutors could assume the lead for prosecuting and adjudicating cases with internationals in a minority role.

[xxi] The UNMIK model with its cadre of international judges and prosecutors (IJP) is illustrative since it had an unprecedented number of international staff investigated and successfully prosecuted in Kosovo for crimes of rape, corruption, gender-violence, murder, and other crimes, as UN Headquarters was willing to waive immunity and allow investigation and trial by its own IJP. This proposal is similar to one made by the Stimson Center. See William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, “Ending impunity: New tools for criminal accountability in UN peace operations,” Issue Brief, Stimson Center, September 2009, 3.

[xxii] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” 2008, 31-2.

[xxiii] See the UN Convention Against Corruption’s mandatory crimes and optional crime of illicit enrichment, UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, and the USIP Model Penal Code.

[xxiv] Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, A/55/305–S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, 1.

[xxv] See the discussion of “Panels of Experts” by Alix Boucher in the Toolkit chapter.

[xxvi] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (Second edition), (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013). Available at

[xxvii] See the discussion of the “Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program” by Matt Chessen and Robert Krech in Vol II.

[xxviii] These recommendations are derived from the contributions by Scott Carlson on “Accountability” and Mark Kroeker on “Institutional Development” In Vol II.

[xxix] Christine Cheng, “Private and Public Interests: Informal Actors, informal influence, and economic order after war,” in Mats Berdal and Dominki Zaum (eds), Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 63 and 75.

[xxx] As cited by William O’Neill, “UN Rule of Law in Peace Operations and Special Political Missions: Time to Change the Way of Doing Business,” Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, March 30, 2015, 5-6.

[xxxi] See DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, 58. “…reforms should seek to address issues relating both to the operational capacity of security bodies (effectiveness) and how they are governed (accountability).”

[xxxii] See Transparency International, “Definitions.” Available at

[xxxiii] See, for example, Karolina MacLachlan, Elise Dufief, Kari Kietzer, Xavier Lhôte, “Security Assistance, Corruption and Fragile Environments: Exploring the Case of Mali 2001-2012,” Transparency International, (August 2015), 40.

[xxxiv] Transparency International, “Definitions.”

[xxxv] United Nations Inter-Agency Team on National Capacity Development, “United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts,” July 20, 2013, 4.

[xxxvi] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook,” January, 2014, 91.

[xxxvii] United Nations Guidance Note, 20.

[xxxviii] See also the Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook, 27. “The analysis of capacities should also include an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses in the capacity and accountability of national institutions.”

[xxxix] Security Assistance, Corruption and Fragile Environments, 38.

[xl] For a catalogue of metrics for these and other outcomes that are essential for stabilization and conflict transformation, see John Agoglia, Michael Dziedzic, and Barbara Sotrin (eds), Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010). Available at

[xli] See the DPKO Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook, 72. The Integrated Strategic Framework must include a monitoring and reporting framework to track adherence to responsibilities and progress towards results with a view to promoting accountability, making adjustments to activities or re- vising plans.

[xlii] Lorenzo Deslegues and Huma Gupta, “Community-based Monitoring,” in Vol. II.

[xliii] See

[xliv] Haki Abazi, “Civil Society Triangle” in Vol. II.

[xlv]Kosovo: The Kosovo iberation Army, 184.

[xlvi] This recommendation is derived from the contributions by Bertram Welsing on “Criminal Intelligence-led Policing” in Vol. II.

[xlvii] “Open sources research” refers to publicly accessible data posted online and on social media channels. 

[xlviii] “Human resources management” refers to the development and case management of sources and agents, protection programs, and rewards and compensation to human sources.

[xlix] “Technical data collection” includes the array technically possible, legally authorized, electronic data collection.

[l] DPKO “Guidelines: Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions,” January 1, 2016.

[li]See the “Criminal Intelligence-led Policing” section in the Toolkit chapter.

[lii] Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, Michael Dziedzic, Robert Oakley and Elliot Goldberg (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), pp. 8-13.

[liii] The term “stability police” is a generic term for “…robust, armed police units that are capable of performing specialized law enforcement and public order functions that require disciplined group action. They are trained in and have the flexibility to use either less-than-lethal or lethal force, as circumstances dictate. They are rapidly deployable, logistically self-sustainable, and able to collaborate effectively with both the military and the police components of a peace mission.” Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Contemporary Peace Operations, Michael Dziedzic and Chris Stark, USIP PeaceBrief, June, 2006.

[liv] H. Peter Langille, “Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment,” International Peace Institute, October 2014. 8.

[lv] The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,” August 06, 2014. Available at

[lvi] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Policy (Revised)

Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Ref. 2009. 32, March 1, 2010, 7.

[lvii] International Conference on the Protection of Civilians, “Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians,” June 1, 2015. Available at

[lix] Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, eds. Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley, Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 2005.